Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the countervailing power retailers has had a restraining influence on increases in seller market concentration in food manufacturing industries. We empirically test this notion by examining changing concentration (ACR4) from 1967 to 1987 across 48 processed food product classes. Em model developed and tested by Venturini, we measure countervailing power of retailers wit of market sales of private-label products.
I. Introduction
The evidence that high sales concentration among U.S. food manufacturers leads to higher-than-competitive selling prices and profits seems overwhelming. Drawing on data from 1950 to the mid-1970s, numerous statistical investigations established significant, positive relationships between seller concentration and oligopolistic performance indicators (Connor et al. 1985: Chapter 7) . These studies generally give consistent predictions. When one compares the lowest observed levels of concentration with the highest observed levels, ceteris paribus, processed food prices rise about 10 to 1 4 percent, price-cost margins (gross margins) rise about 65 percent, and profits increase about 100-200 percent. Since most of these studies were published, a number of criticisms have been raised about the assumptions imbedded in the Bainsian structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach and the interpretation of results. However, a recent survey of newer estimation techniques that relax most of the SCP assumptions found that concentration continues to exert a An earlier version of this paper was presented at a conference entitled 'Economics of Innovation -The Case of the Food Industry', sponsored by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Piacenza, Italy, June 10-1 1, 1994. The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful reviews of Steve Erickson and Paul Farris of Purdue University. Purdue Journal Paper Number 14317.
positive relationship on the size of industries (Connor and Peterson, It is the negative relationship efficiency1 that has caused econ orable rise in food industry conc four food manufacturers selling an average of about 40 percent of t the 1 987 Census of Manufactures at least 60 percent in national foo The two determinants of changin industries were believed to be w "regression toward the mean" ef related to change in concentratio more specifically the electronic presumably by creating long-lasti have failed to confirm that eithe scale had any significant effects (1993) proposed that Rogers' mod known two-stage, game theory m competition by retailers as an exp with 1958-1977 data from the U. proxy for vertical competition d finding, if upheld, has important The issue known to economists a cally the same as the question ad Has market power shifted from f Opinion surveys of food marketi toward retailers. A 1992 survey o found agreement among all three agreed) and that the shift favore Grocer', April, 1992, Part 2, p.
major reasons for increased retail manufacturers, which has forced including slotting and renewal al to information on product sales d 1 Rising concentration may give rise to the evidence is not so clear as it is for sta That is, omitting highly localized mar soft-drink bottling, and manufactured ic markets is not available.
3 The period covered in Rogers' study was 1958 -1977 . Retesting this model with 1967 -1982 changes in concentration upheld the earlier results (Tokle, Rogers, and Adams, 1990) .
4 The finding also calls into question whether the static structure-performance results were misspecified by omitting measurements of retailer power. See the literature review below. out technology; (3) increased grocery retailer concentration in local ma slowing overall growth and declining effectiveness of advertising in food and (5) greater numbers of private-label programs.
Yet, rigorous tests of this alleged shift in power have yet to be seen. W retailer concentration has indeed increased in the United States, food man concentration properly measured increased apace (Marion et al ., 1987) . inflation-adjusted amount spent on food advertising by manufacturers almost constant in the 1980s, that is hardly evidence that advertising eff has declined. The most satisfactory approach taken to analyze this ques been to look at relative profit rates or stock prices of manufacturers an over time. Farris and Ailawadi (1992) examined the profits of listed com from 1972 to 1990 and concluded that grocery retailer profits were stead food manufacturer profits rose. A similar study using somewhat bette found that comparing 1986-1991 profits on equity with 1961-1966 prof manufacturers' profits rose much more than retailers (Messinger and Nar 1993, Table 12 ). Therefore, there is a contradiction between busines opinions on this issue and the scant quantitative analyses available.5
The purpose of this paper is to explore further the role of countervailin by grocery retailers on changing concentration in the U.S. food manuf industries. We develop and test alternative models of concentration chang measures of vertical competition. In addition, we extend the period invest Venturini (1993) by ten years to 1987. There are several reasons to believ decade of the 1980s might yield quite different results than earlier period H. Countervailing Power John Kenneth Galbraith takes full credit for inventing the concept of co ing power. "The notion ... has been almost completely excluded from ec thought" (Galbraith, 1952, pp. 1 10-1 11) . Yet, finding a precise definitio braith's writing proves to be difficult. Perhaps the statement that com is:
Private economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it. The first begets the second. The long trend toward concentration of industrial enterprise . . . has brought into existence not only strong sellers . . . .but also strong buyers (ibid., p. 1 1 1) Thus, according to Galbraith, countervailing power is an autonomous regulator of competition, which operates much like Adam Smith's invisible hand to check increases in seller concentration or improve static performance in the sellers' industry. The automatic nature of the countervailing power of organized buyers fits in well with Galbraith's evident disdain for government antitrust policies.
Galbraith, whose early career w many examples of successful coun system. Consumer retail food coop cooperatives in the United States a food manufacturers (ibid., p. 126 of countervailing power was an ep grocery retailer, the Great Atlant about the high price of corn fla study (2.1 million 1994 dollars) to integrating into the manufacturi study to its suppliers, the mere t 10 percent price discount from th 123). However, Galbraith does adm solidarity and consumer brand loy tobacco manufacturing is given as The theory and empirical relevan of a memorable debate (Galbraith the absence of a rigorous theory the lack of evidence that large-scal products made by the most concen proposed that countervailing power correlation between high concentr (or subsequent) rise in buyer concen while Galbraith's definition of co tration dynamics, all of his examp power. Indeed, nearly all subseque power hypothesis has tested the st turers' profits or price-cost margin III. The Venturini Model Venturini (1993) must be credited with bringing economists back to a consideration of the dynamic implications of the countervailing power of distributors, which he has rechristened "Vertical Competition." Venturini's model explaining market concentration change draws on concepts from John Sutton's (1991) well-known book. Sutton, frustrated by the difficulties of operationalizing theoretical models of oligopoly, sought a simple, but robust prediction on the relationship between market concentration and market size. This question has occupied industrial-organization 6 Scherer and Ross (1990) also discuss a related hypothesis. Sellers in producer-goods industries should have higher margins if the inputs they sell are "unimportant" to buyers {i.e., the intermediate products form a small share of all inputs used by buyers). At least three statistical studies confirm this relationship in U.S. manufacturing.
economists since the seminal book by Joe Bain (1966) on internationa in industrial concentration.
In brief, Sutton's theory and empirical findings demonstrate that in the limit a negative relationship is present for industries where sunk costs of entry are exogenous, but the tendency toward déconcentration is lost when firms can pursue strategies to increase sunk costs-the case of endogenous sunk costs (Connor 1992) . The other major factor affecting market concentration is the degree of pricing toughness. When pricing is tough, markets will become more concentrated, as firms require larger market shares to cover their sunk costs. When pricing competition is lax, more firms can survive. Pricing toughness is in turn affected by government industrial policies and the degree of product differentiation. Pricing toughness would lessen as product differentiation increased, shifting the emphasis from price to nonprice rivalry. International comparisons of a series of historical case studies of the food industries provided empirical verification of Sutton's theoretical predictions.
Venturini extended Sutton's theory to include vertical competition between food distributors and food manufacturers. Venturini is specifically interested in the relationship between the branded and unbranded segments in the food sector and how vertical competition will affect market concentration. He hypothesized that industries that experience an increase in the share held by private labels will experience déconcentration. This hypothesis is justified with two models.
In the first "technological" model, Venturini divides the consumers into two groups. Type I consumers of manufacturer brands are loyal to products, and Type II consumers are foodservice firms or retailers who purchase the food products to sell as own brands. The first group defines the size of the branded sector, 0, and the second group defines the size of the unbranded and private label sector, 1-9 , where 0 < 9 < 1 . The private label segment is characterized by smaller manufacturing firms that do not advertise but compete solely on the basis of efficiency in production and distribution. These smaller firms can co-exist with the larger, marketing-oriented firms, because Type II consumers are unwilling to pay for the higher costs of marketing and advertising that brand manufacturers must incur.
These two groups of firms are assumed to be distinct -no manufacturing firm supplies both types of buyers. The relationship between these two strategic groups is of primary interest in Venturini' s work. The fixed costs of each of these strategic groups will be markedly different. The branded group's fixed costs of production will consist of the sunk setup cost for a minimum efficient scale plant and endogenously determined advertising costs ( MES' ). The unbranded-private label group's fixed costs consist only of the costs involved in setting up an MES plant ( MES2 ). Given that the branded group's fixed costs are larger, then MES' > MES2. Because in long-run equilib are of equal size, the Herfindahl-H
Then substituting N = 6S/MES' and M = (1 -6)S/MES2, he found: H = 9*MjM + {1_e)^MES2^ (2) where N and M are the equilibrium number of firms in the branded segment and private-label segment, and S is the total market size. Given that M E S' > M E S2, the partial derivative of H in [2] with respect to 6 is positive. Therefore, as the private-label share, (1 -0), increases, concentration will fall, even though market size remains constant.
Venturini' s second theoretical model builds on Sutton's two-stage, CournotNash model with advertising an endogenous sunk cost for manufacturers of branded products. In the first stage, higher advertising expenditures could enhance the demand for a firm's product in the second stage. In this model there are again two groups of consumers, two strategic groups of manufacturers, and no dual branding. In the branded strategic group, advertising is positive and endogenous, while advertising is zero in the unbranded group. The equilibrium number of firms in both strategic groups (N and M ) is an outcome of Cournot-Nash competition. Under certain parametric assumptions, the partial derivative of H w.r.t. 6 yields:
A numerical analysis shows that, concentration will increase. Only Venturini also shows that H declines with increases in S.
Therefore, taking into account both of Venturini 's models, a behavioral model of the following form is suggested: AH = a + /?i (PL) + fo-S, (4) where PL = ( 1 -0) is the private-label share (2) and (3), we expect ß' < 0 and ßi < 0. Bec index of sales concentration H has only been 1987, too brief a span, we use ACR4 in p indexes are known to be highly correlated w two indexes ought to be closely correlated a be augmented with other explanatory variab empirical studies.
IV. Private Labels and Vertical Competition in the Food Industrie
A critical feature of Venturini 's model is the assumption that the share label products in total product category sales (PL) is a reasonable prox countervailing power of grocery retailers. In this section we examine th of private-label products, describe their empirical significance in the fo and appraise the suitability of PL as a variable in industrial-organization Foods and beverages sold in grocery stores may be divided into three ly significant categories: manufacturers' or packers' brands, private-labe and unbranded products. All prepackaged foods in the United States are have on their labels "manufactured by. . . ," "packed by. . . ," or "distribut
The first two cases are commonly called "national brands" or "manufa brands," many of which are distributed in only a few states of the U facturers* brands account for about two-thirds of the sales of grocery f measured at manufacturers' shipments values (Connor et al , 1985 , degree of consumer loyalty or repetitive purchases varies along a spectr very strong to relatively weak. "Coca-Cola" and "Marlboro" are widely r as strong brands, but some brands are very weak. For example, most eg in U.S. stores with the name of the packer on the egg carton, but mo stores sell only one brand of eggs on a given day and frequently chang of eggs they stock in the store. This is an example of weak brand loyal that eggs could just as well be sold in cartons without the packer's nam words, very weak packer brands shade into the private-label category. Private-labels are also known as "store brands" or "controlled brand British English are called "own brands"). Private-label products have la tell the consumer who is responsible for distributing the item, but the m er's name is practically never shown. The brand shown on the private item is either a trademark owned by a grocery chain (a true "store br trademark owned by a wholesale distributor7 (a true "controlled bran brand programs are typically found among the 40 to 50 largest U.S. gro chains, whereas smaller chains and independent stores contract with w to use their controlled brands (Marion et al , 1987) . Thus, it is not unu the same private-label trademarks in the stores of two or more smaller the same city. Most commercial data sources cannot distinguish betwe store brands and wholesaler controlled brands.
The leading grocery chains obtain their private-label products in two way most large chains vertically integrate backward into food manufacturin (1975) presented data that the 40 largest U.S. grocery chains manufact in their own plants that accounted for 9.8 percent of their retail sales in share dropped to 6.9 percent in 1967 and has remained at about 7 percent (Marion et al ., 1987, Table 5-8) . Grocery retailers account for about 2.5 total food manufacturing output in the United States, but it is highly co in fluid milk, ice cream, bread, mea 1985, Table B-9).
Second, the major part of private wholesalers on a negotiated basis fro et a/., 1985, pp. 219-226). Retailers change their suppliers. This is especia label products that is distinctly lower Regular private-label products typica than manufacturers' brands, and ret of the leading brands. The variety a affect the enterprise images of grocer of the sales of private-label food pro
In the United States, private-label p of total grocery-store sales volume closely related to macroeconomic con in 1982, a year of deep recession an about 10 percent by 1988 during ye percent in the early 1990s. Private l countries.8
Private-label penetration in the United States varies considerably across product categories. In 1980, private-label (and generic) products accounted for very low sales shares in canned baby food {PL = 0.7 percent), ready-to-eat breakfast cereals (3.0 percent), and frozen dinners (4.2 percent) (Connor et al.y 1985, p. 222) . However, PL was very high in sugar (54.6 percent), frozen orange juice (54.0 percent), canned peaches (50.5 percent), and canned tomatoes (49.6 percent). An even more complete study of 1980 shares found that private-label products as a group were the leading "brand" in 81 out of 378 warehoused food product categories. Data from 1993 show that U.S. private-label shares are in most cases similar to 1980 (Galbraith, 1993; Shapiro, 1993) .
There is considerable research trying to explain cross-sectional variation in PL. Parker (1975) showed that backward vertical integration into food manufacturing in the 1960s by grocery retailers was significantly positively correlated with concentration in food manufacturing; the simple correlation coefficient ranged from +0.45 to +0.68. Parker considered this strong evidence that the manufacture of 8 In 1992-1993, private-label foods had captured almost 30 percent of the sales in British and Swiss super-markets, more than 20 percent of the French and German, and almost 20 percent of the Dutch and Belgian markets (Ogilvie, 1994, p. 26; Hughes, 1994) . The French retailer Carrefour sells more than 3,000 store brands that are priced on average 15 percent lower than the leading brands in the same category. The leading U.K. grocery retailer, Sainsbury, has 8,000 private-label items out of 16,000 items in its average store (de Lisser and Helliker, 1994) . Moreover, Sainsbury has been introducing 1,400 to 1,500 new private-label products each year, while dropping hundreds of others that have proved unpopular. Gross margins on Sainsbury 's private-label products are twice as high as the margins on manufacturers' brands. The extensive private-label programs of European grocery retailers have been aided by the formation of international wholesale "buying groups" (Linda, 1993) .
private-label products occurs in industries with market power, unless the indu was too small to allow retailers to achieve economies of scale or the loyalty manufacturers' brands was too great. Later, Parker and Connor (1979) Private-label share would seem to be an incomplete measure of vertical competition between food retailers and food manufacturers. Relative information access, temporal measures of advertising or promotion effectiveness, and measures of the actual share of promotions received by retailers relative to manufacturers' willingness to pay are all potentially useful indicators of relative power. However, none of these is measurable at this time to our knowledge. By contrast, PL is measurable, though difficult or expensive to obtain.
It seems desirable to include the sales of both regular private-labels and generics in any measure of PL . But what about the third category of grocery productsunbranded goods? Unbranded foods are found mainly in fresh meats and seafood, fresh fruits and vegetables, random-cut cheeses, and certain delicatessen items.
These items are purchased in bulk and sorted or wrapped by retailers in their stores. Because retailers have typically resisted encroachment by branded products into their unbranded product categories, we believe that it is appropriate lo include unbranded sales in any measure of PL as we have done in this study.
9 These 41 five-digit SIC product-class observations were built up from 167 finer product categories taken from a leading commercial supplier of grocery market information. The sample included all warehouse grocery categories with PL > 5 percent 10 Being held constant are advertising intensity {TAS), the leading brand market share, and generics' presence and share. This monumental study had a sample of thousands of brands of processed foods and beverages.
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V. The Sample
In 1987 the Census includes 160 pro digit SICs) which most economists ag consumer product markets than mo the more aggregated four-digit indust with an economic market (e.g., beer tobacco markets to test the hypoth that were classified as producer good classes, those product classes that w level were replaced by the more app Others, most notably Wright (1978) , rejected this specification due to edness [0, 100] and used a transformed dependent variable that treate in concentration from 4 to 5 the same as a change from 40 to 50 or fr (see Rogers, 1984 for details). Previous research found Wright's specif negligible effects on the estimates. We use only the simple arithmetic d this paper.
Initial Concentration Ratio (ICR)
ICR is the beginning year's four-firm concentration. In their survey article on concentration-change studies, Cuny and George (1 983) conclude that ICR was the most important explanatory variable. A negative relationship is expected because leading firms in concentrated industries are likely to lose market share over time to fringe firms by following dominant-firm strategies. In addition, empirical researchers find unconcentrated industries tend to increase in concentration over time (Rogers 1984) . ICR helps correct for the boundedness in A CR.
Initial Size (IS)
Industry size is measured by the natural logarithm of value of shipments in the initial year. Including IS follows directly from Equation (4).
Growth (GRO)
Since this is a concentration change study, some economists might argue that the most relevant variable is change in industry size or the industry's growth rate. In previous concentration-change studies, growth was the most commonly used explanatory variable, yet it has both theoretical and empirical support for either a negative or a positive influence on concentration change. If large firms outgrow small firms, as they might during strong merger waves, then growth could lead to higher concentration. However, if growth creates niches that encourage new entry on a small scale, then growth should result in lower concentration. Growth is measured by the percentage increase in value of shipments over time.
Advertising Intensity (TAS)
Economists differ on whether advertising impedes or encourages entry into consumer goods markets. A new firm entering a market with established firms that have been advertising their products for decades will likely turn to advertising to inform consumers of its new presence in the market. To switch consumers, entrants will usually have to advertise or promote their products more intensely than the incumbents. This use of advertising to assist entry is often cited as supporting the position that advertising aids entry. However, the higher advertising intensity of new entrants might trigger a reaction from existing firms who would escalate their advertising levels to protect thei firms can withstand the new, hig fail. Connor et al. (1985) conclud product differentiation was the manufacturing industries. Research on advertising and co advertising data across a wide sp categorical variables to represent Tokle (1996) reviewed available da data supplied by a private comm are best suited to research on co by LNA for both 1977 and 1987, intensity hypothesis for a total m 6. Private Label Share (PL) Vertical competition is measured by the percent share held by private label (and generic) products. The 1977 private label share, which includes unbranded food product sales, was calculated by Connor (1982) . As PL increases we would expect retailers to countervail, as shown in Equation (4).
Minimum Efficient Size (MES)
MES serves as a technical barrier to entry created by economies of scale and, therefore, should be positively related to ACR. Four times MES is a lower bound on CR4. The MES value is critical to Sutton's model because it is a proxy for the exogenous sunk costs a firm must commit to enter an industry. In Venturini 's technological model, the effect of MES is already included in PL. Despite its theoretical appeal, the empirical proxies available suffer substantial shortcomings. The method of calculating MES in this and most other studies rely on the midpointplant size approach calculated from Census data. Although this approach has been shown to be highly correlated with the preferred economic-engineering estimates (Connor et al. 1985) , the approach still suffers from being limited to single-product plant level economies of scale, rather than scope or firm level. Also it has an upward bias whenever constant costs are found, since large firms can expand beyond MES levels without a cost disadvantage. Moreover, as MES is by construction positively highly related to concentration, we make only limited use of it in models where initial concentration is included.
To summarize, the augmented version of Equation (4) takes the following form: ACR4 = a+ßi ICR+foPL + ßtGRO+ßsIS+foTAS+fcMES + e (-) (-) (-) (+) (+) ' (6) where the expected signs of the regression coefficients are given in pa For these coefficients, we apply one-tail tests of statistical significanc growth variable GRO has an ambiguous prediction.
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics of the main variables are given in Table III Industry size varied dramatically from the veiy small (canned mushrooms) t the very large (soft drinks). Growth in value of shipments measured in nomin terms increased on average 71 percent over the 1977 to 1987 period. The use of nominal growth does fail to capture the declining size of the cigarette industry its price increases more than offset its reduced volume sold during this period Finally, minimum efficient scale (MES), had an average value of 3 percent 1987, implying about 33 single-plant firms of optimal size would fit in the avera food industry.
Simple correlations for the main variables are given in Table IV Although simple correlations among independent variables do not give the full picture of potential multicollinearity problems, when two variables have a high correlation it can prove difficult to unravel their independent explanatory power an OLS regression. Perhaps the most noteworthy is the high correlations betwee PL and CR411 and T ASH . In fact, a regression of PL on just CR4 and TAS (and T AS squared) yields a strong fit in each year, explaining just over half of th observed variation. This relationship between PL and standard structural variable is a concern for empirical testing of the vertical competition hypothesis. In Tables II and IH , we undertook to alternative samples and variable E), we calculated some interaction private label and initial concentrat centration dummy split at CRA of in concentrated and unconcentrat empirical support suggests that pri effect in the more concentrated m tion 5a), neither interaction term w 5b) the private-label effect was ne In Equations 6a and 6b, the interaction betwee TAS -1 %) was tested. Again in the shorter per longer period, private label share ( P LIT LA ) di for industries with low advertising intensities.
industries, private label share was unrelated to The four models that are presented in Table i in the effect from advertising intensity. Becau its two forms did not prove successful, we lim
In the first two models, we omit PL and us prove significant in the shorter time period (Eq TAS11 reaches positive significance at the 10 pe quadratic term remains positive throughout the 8 is the first time we included the MESH vari significant in both periods. This finding is cons larger the MES , the fewer firms that will be abl However, readers should recall our reservations The last two models in Table HI We fail to find any evidence supporting a dynamic version of Galbraith's count vailing-power hypothesis. Nothing in our empirical work can be construed support for the idea that retailer vertical competition kept U.S. food-manufactur from becoming more concentrated in the 1980s, though Venturini found such relationship in earlier periods. Nor can we find support for Sutton's (1991) mod that suggests that industry size is inversely related to concentration. The reason for rejecting these models deserve investigation.
There are three avenues that we believe may reward further empirical effort First, our results for the 1980s may be due to special characteristics of the decad
We have already mentioned the egregiously lax enforcement of U.S. antitrust law especially merger controls. We note that Rogers and Ma (1994) also find that t pre-Venturini models of concentration change have broken down in the 1980s. It quite common for macroeconomic conditions to break previously sturdy structur relationships. In their study of the influence of buyers' concentration on allocati efficiency, Clevinger and Campbell (1977) also found the significance of buyer CR4 sensitive to time period.
12 In some further testing, not reported here, we found that the effect from ICR did differ depen ing on whether the industry was initially concentrated or unconcentrated. The more concentra industries displayed a much smaller (about one-half the size) estimated coefficient than was found the unconcentrated (CR4 < 50) industries. This result is consistent with that found by Tokle, Roger and Adams (1990) for all manufacturing industries over the 1967 to 1982 period. Additionally, l Venturini, we found that the deconcentrating effect from growth differed for industries with low adve tising (less than 1%) from that found in higher advertising industries. Only in the low-advertis industries did growth have a significant deconcentrating effect. In addition, we estimated a model the 1977 to 1987 period where every variable was entered in both its 1977 level (e.g., PL11) an as an absolute change from 1977 to 1987 (except for growth, which was a percentage change). these models both PL and change in PL took negative signs, but insignificant. Growth was negat and significant at the 10 percent level. The change in TAS was insignificant, both in a statisti sense and in magnitude, but the level variable, TASI!, was negative and significant, contrary to expectations.
Second, our results may depend on the particular measure of private label PL that we devised. Perhaps in the 1980s food manufacturers developed str gies (e.g., promotional expenditures) to counteract effectively against privat programs. Perhaps the PL measure should exclude unlabeled products. Perh retailer backward vertical integration works differently from contractual pr label purchases. Perhaps the information advantages of retailers have becom major source of countervailing power, and private-label programs no longer p any clout for retailers.
Third, more attention needs to be given to alternative market samples. M and Kim (1991) concluded that statistical studies of concentration change r have nothing to say about producer-good industries in food manufacturing is obvious that the largest increases in food-industry concentration occurr producer-good industries or nearly homogenous-good consumer industries, as beefpacking (Connor, 1991) . This upheaval in historical patterns in the 198 a most curious phenomenon.
